Glas Srpske

An interview with Glas Srpske, a daily newspaper from Bosnia & Herzegovina, published today. English version below.

1. Are the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia still considered as the "bad guys" by the world media? If they are, how long will it last?

Anti-Serbian media bias has obviously faded over the years, but it has not gone away. When Radovan Karadzic was arrested last year, for example, the British media immediately recycled all the old distortions and repeated the same one-sided version of the Bosnian war that they peddled in the 1990s.

Partly this is a problem of the media themselves – many crusading Western journalists took sides in the Bosnian conflict and some explicitly repudiated the principle of journalistic objectivity. They all then did exactly the same again a few years later when NATO went to war over Kosovo, turning it into another epic battle of ‘good’ against ‘evil’.

It is also partly a problem of journalists simply following political leaders. For Western politicians, it is clearly still tempting to use the stick of unresolved war crimes charges and memories of ‘genocide’ to beat today’s Serbian politicians. It’s not that Western leaders are anti-Serb as such – I doubt that many have strong feelings either way – more that by striking this pose they can claim moral superiority for themselves.

2. Can you comment on the fact that Veselin Sljivancanin was convicted by Hague Tribunal to serve additional 12 years, after he almost finished his first sentence (5 years in prison)? Opposed to that, the first verdict in case of Naser Oric was two years in prison, but the case was dismissed and Oric was set free. In Oric case, was it just lack of evidence?

I thought that was an appalling decision, even by the Hague’s dubious legal standards. The parallel with Naser Oric is apposite, because he was charged with a similar crime – failing to prevent ill-treatment and murder of prisoners. In Oric’s case, it was more serious in the sense that he was accused of not preventing crimes carried out by men who were under his command, whereas in Veselin Sljivancanin’s case the court acknowledged that he did not have authority over the men who actually committed the crimes.

I doubt that court’s very different treatment of these two cases had much to do with the quantity or quality of evidence. The Hague’s decision to extend Sljivancanin’s sentence from 5 to 17 years was not based on any fresh evidence. There were no previously undisclosed facts or any new witness testimony. The judges simply re-read the transcript of the original trial. On that basis they found Sljivancanin guilty of one crime of which he had been previously acquitted (aiding and abetting murder) and decided that he deserved a longer sentence for the original conviction of aiding and abetting torture.

In justifying that decision, the judges claimed that a 5-year sentence did not give enough recognition to the suffering of victims and their families. When you compare that with the way that Oric was handled by the court, it begins to look as if the Hague thinks the suffering of victims and their families is a far less serious matter if those victims are Serbs.

3. Can those verdicts bring BiH to reconciliation?

No, but rather than argue for equal treatment before the court, which would be futile, I think it would be better simply to scrap the ICTY. It has no useful role to play in the Balkans.

I was struck by the fact that in Serbia, when Vojislav Kostunica set up a truth and reconciliation commission a few years ago, supporters of the Hague argued that it must be stopped because justice could only come from outside the country. From their point of view, only the ‘international community’ is capable of delivering justice and reconciliation.

I think the opposite is true: only the people of the region have the power to settle their differences and put the past behind them. International interference in this process is more likely to keep old resentments alive and to prevent people from working out any kind of compromise.

I don’t think the Hague has anything to contribute to reconciliation in BiH – but then that’s not really its purpose. Michael Scharf, a lawyer who helped to write the original ICTY statute for the US State Department, has acknowledged that ‘the tribunal was widely perceived within the [US] government as little more than a public relations device and as a potentially useful policy tool’. For confirmation, look no further than the court’s indictment of Slobodan Milosevic during the Kosovo conflict – as Scharf noted, for the US and UK governments the Hague was ‘a useful tool in their efforts to demonise the Serbian leader and maintain public support for NATO’s bombing campaign’. The ICTY has always been a political court which serves Western interests.

4. What is the connection between Kosovo and Republic of Srpska?

The logical connection is that if Kosovo is internationally recognised as an independent country, then Republika Srpska should be also. Logic, however, does not enter into the matter. Instead, the ‘will of the international community’ is for Republika Srpska not to have any independent existence.

5. Your estimation of integration process of BiH in European Union?

BiH is more integrated into the European Union than any other country, since the EU basically runs the place. Bosnia is effectively a colony of the EU.